Learning from Precedent: Could an International Transitional Authority work for the State of Palestine
Dr Brian Brivati, Executive Director, Britain Palestine Project and Dr Greg Wilson, Developmentum
The Sharm El-Sheikh peace summit has created an opening: a ceasefire, a pledge to surge humanitarian access, phased Israeli draw-down tied to new security arrangements, and an international commitment to finance recovery and back a transitional administration for Gaza. Those promises are necessary—but not sufficient. This report is written to help UK policymakers turn summit language into deliverable reality: a sequenced, lawful, and legitimate transition that is Palestinian-led, time-bound, and geared to sovereignty, not another open-ended trusteeship by another name.
Fulfilling the summit’s commitments requires hard architecture, not aspirational communiqués. That means a Chapter VII mandate with a clear end-state; a 24–36 month, conditions-based roadmap to elections and reintegration under re-unified Palestinian institutions; a governing board with a Palestinian chair and majority; an enforceable de-confliction and draw-down framework for any residual Israeli role; rapid deployment of an International Stabilisation Force under defined rules of engagement and a Joint Security Coordination Centre; and a comprehensive DDR/SSR track that moves armed actors into accountable policing—so no parallel armed structures endure. Above all, it means ending the blockade logic: without freedom of movement and an economy that can breathe, a new cycle of violence will be incubated.
The summit was silent or ambiguous on pillars that decide success. This report sets them out plainly: a constitutional basis for transitional authority and law-making anchored in Palestinian sovereignty; a transitional-justice pathway (documentation, reparations, due process) and a property and restitution regime to govern return and rebuilding; guardrails against profiteering in reconstruction (open contracting, beneficial-ownership transparency, conflict-of-interest rules); a single, coherent reconstruction lead with public performance dashboards to close the mandate–resource gap; and full linkage of Gaza’s track to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with meaningful participation of women and youth under UNSCR 1325. These are not add-ons; they are the difference between a pause and a durable peace based on parity of esteem and the rule of law.
What follows distils lessons from precedent, identifies eight priority challenges, and offers six concrete recommendations, supported by two annexes: a readiness checklist for any transitional authority and a gap analysis of the current GITA blueprint. If the summit was the political green light, this is the build sheet: who does what, in what order, under what authority, with what money, and to what measurable end. Deliver the summit—and more—by making the transition tightly mandated, locally owned, disciplined in scope, transparently financed, and time-bound. Anything less risks reproducing an expensive, contested trusteeship that cannot command public legitimacy and will fail Palestinians and Israelis alike.
The full report can be downloaded HERE
Author Disclaimer
This report represents the independent analysis and professional opinions of Dr Brian Brivati and Dr Gregory Wilson. It is intended to inform policy dialogue and academic discussion on transitional governance and post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.
The views, interpretations, and recommendations expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of the Britain Palestine Project, any government, international organisation, donor, or institution with which the authors are or have been affiliated.