The weaponisation and privatisation of Gaza humanitarian aid
Britain Palestine Project Briefing 2
Dr Brian Brivati, Executive Director, Britain Palestine Project
13 May 2025
“Israeli officials have sought to shut down the existing aid distribution system run by the United Nations and its humanitarian partners and have us agree to deliver supplies through Israeli hubs under conditions set by the Israeli military, once the government agrees to re-open crossings.” The Humanitarian Country Team stressed that the design of the plan “will mean large parts of Gaza, including the less mobile and most vulnerable people, will continue to go without supplies.” The UN Humanitarian Country Team of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 4th May 2025
“After more than two months of aid into Gaza being blocked, Palestinians continue to face immense suffering. Essential supplies of food and medicine are either no longer available or quickly running out. As the United Nations has already said, it is hard to see how, if implemented, the new Israeli plan to deliver aid through private companies would be consistent with humanitarian principles and meet the scale of the need. We need urgent clarity from the Israeli Government on their intentions.” Hamish Falconer, Middle East Minister, FCDO, House of Commons, 6th May 2025
“Whereas this time last week, a million meals a day were being provided, which is a lot, but for a population of 2 million needing three meals a day, … we can see what the deficit is. Those kitchens that were providing [food] … are now down to about 400 thousand”. Sam Rose, UNRWA’s acting Director, Gaza Field Office, speaking at Britain Palestine Project Annual Conference, 8th May 2025
UK government policy – our asks
In light of the imminent launch of a non-UN aid distribution mechanism by the US and Israel for Gaza, the British government should continue its strong support for UNWRA stressed by Hamish Falconer in the House of Commons, as quoted above and in the UK submission to the ICJ hearing on the military occupation of Palestinian Territory. See Britain Palestine Project Briefing 1, But it should go further and:
· Back UN and Local Aid Networks: Channel all UK humanitarian aid for Gaza through UN agencies (e.g. UNRWA) and trusted local and international NGOs; continue to reject privatised or militarised schemes like the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” that risk excluding civilians and undermining neutrality.
· Support a technocratic Palestinian Authority-led Transition: Promote a transitional governance structure in Gaza led by the Palestinian Authority to restore basic services and prepare for elections, with no role for Hamas and led by technocrats.
· Enforce an Arms and Security Embargo: Impose an immediate full arms embargo on Israel, suspend intelligence sharing on Gaza, and expand export restrictions on dual-use components (e.g. drone engines) that may be used in violation of international humanitarian law.
· Support the reactivation of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) by backing the redeployment of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at the Rafah crossing, to ensure neutral, rules-based oversight of aid and goods entering Gaza.
· Coordinate Diplomacy with Key Allies: Work closely with France and Saudi Arabia at the 17-19 June Middle East Peace conference in New York to ensure the PA leads with Egyptian and regional powers supporting reconstruction.
· Recognise the State of Palestine now on pre-June 1967 lines, consistent with the July 2024 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ which declared the 1967 occupation to be “unlawful” – France is poised to recognise Palestine next month but needs support. The UK has a moral duty to lead on recognition, in light of its historic responsibility for preventing Palestinian self-determination during the British Mandate.
Context
The Gaza Strip is facing an unprecedented humanitarian and governance crisis after 19 months of war. The renewal of the blockade in March 2025 means 2.3 million Palestinians are starving. Since October 2023, more than 52,000 have been killed, and over 90% of the population has been displaced. Gaza’s vital infrastructure has been destroyed: 95% of hospitals are non-functional, and every education facility has been damaged or destroyed. The scale of destruction and human suffering is staggering – and the international community, including the UK, rightly faces growing scrutiny over its response.
A central question is how to deliver life-saving aid. The Israeli-proposed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) – a system based on military-style “aid hubs” and private contractors – has triggered alarm across the humanitarian sector. UN agencies have refused to participate, warning that the GHF would “weaponise” aid, forcing civilians to rely on militarised and selectively accessible distribution centres. Experts argue that this model undermines humanitarian neutrality and creates perverse incentives for criminal networks to monopolise access. The UK’s Minister for the Middle East has also expressed scepticism, questioning whether a privatised system controlled by the occupying power can uphold humanitarian principles or meet Gaza’s vast needs.
In contrast, established humanitarian channels – particularly UNRWA and Palestinian and international NGOs – offer a trusted and experienced alternative. These actors have operated in Gaza for decades and remain deeply embedded in communities. Roughly half of UK aid for Palestinians is channelled through UNRWA. Strengthening these existing networks, rather than replacing them with untested, opaque mechanisms subject to manipulation for political and military purposes, is the surest way to ensure effective, impartial aid delivery.
The crisis extends beyond humanitarian relief to the political vacuum left by the collapse of Hamas’s governance. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is the only competent and legitimate authority capable of assuming responsibility for Gaza through a technocratic interim government. The UK has endorsed the principle of reunifying Gaza and the West Bank under an empowered and reformed PA, excluding Hamas from future governance. Arab and Palestinian leaders – supported by Egypt and Qatar – have outlined a vision for a unity government based on technocratic leadership. France, Egypt, and Jordan have jointly declared that both governance and security in Gaza must fall under PA authority, with this approach expected to be formalised at the Middle East Peace conference in New York.
Background
In response to mounting international pressure, Israel and the United States have advanced the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) as an alternative, fast-track delivery mechanism. Though presented as a means to expedite aid, the GHF departs radically from established humanitarian norms by sidelining the UN system in favour of a model controlled by the very state enforcing the blockade. An Israeli official admitted “the Gazans we remove will not return… We will control the place,” underscoring that displacement, not community recovery, is an explicit feature of the scheme. UNICEF’s assessment is blunt: the plan appears to “reinforce control over life-sustaining items as a pressure tactic and will drive further displacement,” essentially making Palestinians choose “between displacement and death”. Such a design not only violates the principle of aiding people in situ but also turns humanitarian aid into a tool for demographic engineering.
British ministers echoed warnings from UNICEF and UNRWA that the GHF model would deepen the crisis. There are several major flaws in this plan:
Instead of distributing aid in neighbourhoods, GHF concentrates relief at four large sites serving 300,000 people each, under heavy security. Aid workers warn this could “not possibly meet the needs” of Gaza’s 2.3 million residents and would force civilians to travel long distances and crowd into camps for basic supplies. The UN’s emergency aid coordinator bluntly said Israel’s centralised plan is “the opposite of what is needed” in Gaza. UNICEF has warned that concentrating aid at limited, militarised hubs will endanger civilians, forcing children and families to move across active conflict zones in search of food—thus “increasing their suffering”.
· All humanitarian aid delivery must begin with a comprehensive needs assessment, determining where help is most urgently required and how to deliver it safely and equitably. The GHF’s model violates this basic premise by creating a scramble for limited supplies at a handful of Israeli-controlled distribution points—encouraging corruption, enabling criminal gatekeepers, and privileging the strong over the vulnerable. It also proposes a registration system reliant on biometric data, reportedly accessible to the Israeli security services, undermining trust and violating the norm of humanitarian neutrality.
The GHF provides only rudimentary aid – mainly pre-packaged food rations, water, and hygiene kits– with no support for healthcare, education, or housing recovery. Unlike UNRWA (which ran hundreds of schools and clinics in Gaza and elsewhere), the GHF offers only limited life-sustaining items, omitting any plan to rebuild hospitals or shelter the homeless.
Significantly, no aid sites are planned in north Gaza, the area most devastated by fighting, and which some Israeli officials have declared their intention to depopulate. A Norwegian Refugee Council official warned that people would have to move “around aid hubs… essentially turning aid into bait” to force displacement. Such “weaponisation of aid” is a dangerous precedent denounced by the U.N. and NGOs.
Unlike UNRWA’s comprehensive approach—which includes food, healthcare, education, and refugee protection—the GHF offers only limited subsistence aid, dependent on Palestinians accessing a small number of Israeli-established distribution points. Entire areas, particularly in northern Gaza, remain excluded. Moreover, the GHF introduces a dangerous shift toward the privatisation and politicisation of humanitarian relief. Contracts are being awarded to private security firms and logistics providers with little or no transparency or local accountability.
Compounding concerns is the opaque and top-down manner in which the GHF was conceived. The Foundation was quietly registered in Switzerland (Geneva) in February, yet provides no public details on its funding or governance. Its leadership and planning have been shaped more by political and military interests than humanitarian expertise: American and Israeli officials have played outsized roles in setting GHF’s scope and conditions. A U.S. government source, involved in discussions, acknowledged publicly that the “humanitarian mechanism was very much the government of Israel’s idea,” calling the project a “less secure…deadlier” version of previous concepts – and “not the appropriate answer to the dire situation”.
Nevertheless, U.S. envoys have pressured others to accept the plan: Washington’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, even warned the UN that U.S. funding to agencies could be cut if they refused to work under GHF’s terms. This politicised rollout, absent meaningful consultation with UN bodies or local organisations, highlights a deeply troubling lack of transparency in planning and on the underlying intent of the mechanism of delivery which is designed to control the population and pave the way “voluntary departure”. Humanitarian officials note that the GHF’s proposal reads more like a fundraising pitch than a concrete relief strategy. It promises an “independent, rigorously audited” model but fails to explain how it will uphold core humanitarian principles on the ground. The GHF plan pledges adherence to humanitarian principles in name, yet pointedly omits any commitment to international humanitarian law, the very framework that binds neutral aid work in conflict zones.
The UK must uphold its commitment to principled aid delivery by rejecting militarised, privatised models like the GHF and reinforcing support for trusted multilateral and community-based structures.
While U.S. officials touted the GHF as an “independent” mechanism to “get help to people, right now” , it is in fact constrained by Israeli-imposed limits on what can be delivered and where. The Foundation’s operations are therefore not only insufficient but serve to legitimise the ongoing blockade and displacement of Palestinians.
The UK and European Union have voiced clear concerns. Britain’s position is broadly in line with European allies and international partners, who have defended UNRWA and impartial aid delivery. The European Union has been highly critical of efforts to marginalise UN agencies. EU officials condemned any attempt to abrogate the EU’s 1967 agreement with UNRWA or to obstruct its mandate, stressing that no alternative entity can substitute for UNRWA’s work. On 23 April 2025 the Foreign Ministers of the UK, France and Germany (the E3) issued a joint statement explicitly condemning Israel’s aid blockade and politicisation of relief. They declared that Israel’s decision to block aid was “intolerable” and that “humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool”, warning against any demographic engineering in Gaza. The E3 statement insisted that during the previous ceasefire the UN and NGOs had proven capable of delivering aid “at scale”. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas described Gaza’s situation as “untenable” and argued that any “new aid distribution mechanism” must uphold humanitarian principles and not bypass the established UN channels.
Private Contractors and the Privatisation of Aid
The GHF scheme relies on private companies with military ties to manage Gaza’s aid delivery. Instead of neutral humanitarian agencies, U.S.-linked security contractors would handle checkpoints, convoys, and distribution on the ground – a role they have already played along the Netzarim corridor, dividing northern and southern Gaza. This privatisation of aid raises serious transparency and accountability issues:
Safe Reach Solutions (SRS): A U.S. firm which is already running Gaza’s crossing checkpoints, SRS is a shell company, registered via a Wyoming trust that obscures its real owners. Little is known publicly about its leadership or financing but its operations are led by Philip R Reilly, a former chief of the CIA’s paramilitary arm. Reilly was reportedly the architect of the new checkpoint procedures in Gaza’s Netzarim corridor and previously worked with Constellis, the rebranded Blackwater private security force.
UG Solutions: Founded in 2022 by Jameson Govoni, a former U.S. Special Forces soldier, UG Solutions is a private security outfit with experience in special operations. Israel has hired UG Solutions to provide armed security for aid convoys and sites. Govoni’s background (a retired Green Beret) and reports that nearly 100 ex-special forces personnel were deployed by his firm in Gaza suggest a highly militarised operation. The company’s sudden emergence and profit-driven model exemplify the outsourcing of warzone logistics to private hands – a deeply troubling development.
Fogbow: Not directly running aid on the ground, Fogbow is a U.S. consulting firm led by former Pentagon and CIA officials (including ex-Marine General Sam Mundy) that has been advising the GHF. The ex-director of the U.N. World Food Programme and former Governor of North Carolina, David Beasley, is in talks to head the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and is concurrently an adviser to Fogbow.
These companies stand to gain financially from Gaza’s aid contracts, injecting a profit motive into relief delivery. Their military/intelligence pedigrees and secrecy raise concerns about neutrality. Unlike U.N. agencies that operate under public mandates and oversight, private contractors are not bound by the same transparency or humanitarian accountability. Having armed ex-soldiers managing food lines under Israeli military direction effectively converts humanitarian aid into a security operation. If abuses occur or aid is misused, Israel could claim “plausible deniability” by pointing to its contractors, further muddying accountability.
Reclaiming Humanitarian Integrity in Gaza
The humanitarian crisis in Gaza demands a strategy rooted not in ad hoc schemes or political expediency, but in established principles of neutrality, impartiality, and accountability. At the heart of this response must be a recommitment to the multilateral frameworks and institutions that have long ensured aid reaches those most in need. UNRWA has stood for decades as the cornerstone of Gaza’s humanitarian infrastructure. Its work extended far beyond food distribution, encompassing education for nearly 300,000 children, primary healthcare through 22 free clinics, social services for vulnerable groups, and a refugee registry essential to equitable and needs-based aid. Its schools provided emergency shelter to hundreds of thousands during conflict. As UNRWA official Sam Rose observed, these are functions that “can only really be taken over by a functioning State.” Yet instead of reinforcing this system, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation seeks to replace it with a politicised, quasi-privatised mechanism under Israeli and U.S. strategic control—one that disregards humanitarian principles, undermines neutrality, and provokes widespread anxiety among Palestinians and aid experts alike.
The implications reach far beyond Gaza. Endorsing the GHF would establish a dangerous precedent: one in which occupying powers and their allies may unilaterally dismantle neutral humanitarian systems and replace them with security-driven, for-profit aid delivery mechanisms. This risks normalising the weaponisation of aid—transforming relief into a tool of coercion rather than compassion. It also threatens operational effectiveness. The UN and trusted NGOs demonstrated during the 2025 ceasefire that they could deliver aid efficiently and at scale when access was granted. The GHF’s model, by contrast, is built around limited, militarised hubs and private contractors with no humanitarian credibility, aside from figureheads.
As UNICEF and the World Food Programme warned on 12 May 2025, Gaza now teeters on the edge of famine, with tens of thousands suffering acute malnutrition. Such a catastrophe cannot be averted through politicised, centralised distribution or surveillance-driven systems. What is required is a return to principled, community-embedded aid operations that are responsive to actual needs.
Politically, it is essential to respect existing regional frameworks. The GHF disregards the Egypt–Arab League recovery plan endorsed at the March 2025 Cairo emergency summit and entrenches Israel’s monopoly over aid entry points. This must be challenged.
A more legitimate and effective approach lies in reactivating the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and signed by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities. The AMA envisaged open crossings and a neutral monitoring role for the international community. In this context, the European Union’s decision to redeploy the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Rafah crossing is a positive step. Restoring international oversight at Gaza’s gateway to Egypt would help shift the focus back to lawful, accountable access and break the cycle of politicised control.
In sum, Gaza needs principled, not privatised, aid. The international community—and especially the UK—should work to restore and reinforce mechanisms that uphold international law, respect humanitarian norms, and respect the dignity and agency of Palestinians. That begins with defending UNRWA, reasserting the role of the AMA, and rejecting any system that turns food into leverage and aid into a weapon.