What is missing from UNSC Resolution 2803?
Dr Brian Brivati, Executive Director, Britain Palestine Project
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2803 on Gaza governance and a “credible pathway” to Palestinian self-determination notably omits the foundational body of UN resolutions that establish:
the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force,
the illegality of Israeli settlements,
the baseline of the 1967 borders,
the legal status of the Palestinian people as a State,
and the UN’s and UNWRA’s central humanitarian and political role in Gaza.
It also makes no mention of war crimes, crimes against humanity, the crime of starvation or genocide. It is not unusual that it does not mention ICJ and ICC cases, advisory opinions and provisional measures. It is unprecedented that it does not spell out and reaffirm previous UNSC resolutions.
In international law, the fact that the resolution does not cite earlier Security Council and General Assembly resolutions does not repeal or diminish the legal force of those texts, nor does it alter Israel’s obligations as an occupying power or Palestine’s status under GA 67/19. However, the omissions significantly narrow the legal framework within this specific resolution. By declining to reaffirm 242, 338, 2334, 1860, 2712, 2720, 2728 and 67/19, the Council has produced a text that operates on a thinner legal foundation, one that foregrounds security and governance sequencing while remaining silent on borders, occupation, settlement illegality and UN-led humanitarian authority. This silence weakens the “constant reaffirmation” that traditionally anchors the legal acquis on Palestine, creates interpretive space for states to argue that the Council is shifting away from the established consensus, and provides political cover for a more conditional, security-led reading of Palestinian statehood and Gaza governance. In short, the omissions do not change the law, but they change the legal politics of the Council’s engagement—softening the normative environment in which the older resolutions are applied. These omissions are not therefore procedurally neutral. Their omissions also makes clear that the ambiguity of much that is contained in the resolution is intentional. The UK and France, voted for the resolution and publicly endorsed its aims but also noted this weakness. The UK’s UN delegate emphasised that the plan “must be implemented in accordance with international law and [with] respect for Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination”. France similarly welcomed the focus on a political horizon for a two-state solution, while noting that the resolution’s language on Palestinian statehood was more cautious than France might have liked. Both London and Paris viewed the resolution as an important tool to end the violence and begin reconstruction but the substitution of legal context and consistent foundation with reference to Trump’s vague plans represents a major legal fault line through the resolution. The absence of previous resolutions demonstrates the absence of Palestinian agency in the process now proposed, as reported in Passblue:
“The big challenge with this resolution is that it is not based on the consent of the Palestinian people and political formations, and it ignores the necessity to build and promote their consent and cooperation,” wrote Laurie Nathan, a professor of the practice of mediation at the University of Notre Dame, in an email to PassBlue.
“The Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force will consequently lack legitimacy in the eyes of many Palestinians and will be perceived as instruments of coercion and occupation,” Nathan, who teaches in the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, added. “They are likely to be met with Palestinian resistance, including violent resistance. This is not a viable path to peace, security and stability.”
The resolutions that are omitted:
1. UNSC 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)
What they establish:
Palestinian territory is occupied.
Israel cannot lawfully acquire territory through war.
A settlement requires withdrawal of Israeli forces and negotiations on the basis of the 1967 lines.
The draft attempts to reframe the conflict from one of occupation to one of security, avoiding any reference to Israeli withdrawal from illegally occupied territory of the State of Palestine. This omits the legal foundation for calling Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza an occupation governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention.
2. UNGA 67/19 (2012): Recognition of the State of Palestine
What it establishes:
Palestine is recognised as a non-member observer State.
The State is defined on the pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as capital.
The resolution recasts Palestinian statehood as future, conditional, and dependent on PA reform benchmarks, rather than a right grounded in international law. This shifts statehood from a status already conferred by the UN to a political concession subject to Israeli and US approval and defers full membership of the UN by the State of Palestine to a unfixed point in a possible future.
3. UNSC 2334 (2016): Illegality of Settlements
What it establishes:
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are a flagrant violation of international law.
The 1967 lines are the legal basis for a two-state settlement.
The resolution removes any reference to settlement illegality, effectively normalising Israeli settlement expansion and erasing UN consensus on the legal status of the West Bank. This aligns directly with the position of the current Israeli government, the Trump plan and statements by the Trump administration that say there will be no annexation of the West Bank but fail to call the occupation illegal or put any pressure on it to the reversed or settler expansion to end.
4. Gaza Ceasefire & Humanitarian Resolutions (1860; 2712; 2720; 2728)
What they establish:
The UN’s primary role in humanitarian access, including UNWRA.
The obligation to protect civilians.
The requirement for sustained humanitarian pauses and monitoring.
This allows the draft to elevate a non-UN “International Stabilisation Force” and reduce the role of UN agencies (UNRWA, OCHA). This is consistent with Israeli policy to remove UNRWA and shift Gaza management away from multilateral oversight.
Although the resolution has been widely condemned by the Israeli right and the mention of an eventual route to statehood was rejected by the Israeli government, politically, these omissions collectively signal substantial Israeli influence over the content of the resolution. Israel has long lobbied for resolutions 242 and 338 to be diluted because they imply withdrawal; it views resolution 2334 as illegitimate because it labels the settlements illegal; and it rejects resolution 67/19 because it recognises Palestinian statehood. Israel has also sought to dismantle UNRWA and to reduce UN authority in Gaza, supports “sequenced conditionality” tied to Palestinian governance reforms, and opposes any reference to occupation in order to avoid the international legal obligations that flow from it and from ICJ Advisory opinions on occupation and on access for international organisations. The omission of all these elements in a single, adopted Security Council resolution is unprecedented.